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A Race Against Time in The Mideast
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bignate



Joined: 30 Apr 2003
Location: Hell's Ditch

PostPosted: Sun May 29, 2005 8:52 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

Alright, I am ready for another kick at the cat, besides I have some time to kill Razz

Joo wrote:
Big Bird how about a link to show your assertion that Arafat gave up his war?
When did Arafat say to Israel if you just withdraw the war will be over?

Arafat has stated on several occasions that with the withfdrawl of Israeli forces with the help of the UN, then the PLO would renounce terror and exist peacefully. This however doesn't really mean anything, since he was never given a chance to follow up on his proposal, since, Israel has never withdrawn and has actually expanded into the territories. Also, more militant Palestinians, such as those within Hamas, have disrupted any progress of this nature.

PLO Chairman's statement before the General Assembly, Geneva, 13 December 1988
Quote:
"Secondly, on the basis of our belief in international legitimacy and the vital role of the United Nations, that actions be undertaken to place our occupied Palestinian land under temporary United Nations supervision, and that international forces be deployed there to protect our people and at the same time to supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from our country;

"Thirdly, that the PLO will work for the achievement of a comprehensive settlement among the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the State of Palestine, Israel and the other neighbouring States, within the framework of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), so as to guarantee equality and the balance of interests, especially our people's rights to freedom and national independence, and for respect for the right of all the parties to the conflict to exist in peace and security."


PLO Chairman's news conference, Geneva, 14 December 1988
Quote:

"In my speech ... yesterday, it was clear that we mean our people's rights to free and national independence, according to resolution 181, and the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security and, as I have mentioned, including the State of Palestine, Israel and other neighbours, according to resolutions 242 and 338."

"As for terrorism, I renounced it yesterday in no uncertain terms and yet I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism."



On the commonly held opinion that the Palestinians broke up the peace process at Camp David

Quote:
really do you have a source so I can learn more?


Quote:
Take the myth of Barak's "generous offer" (Camp David, 2000) and the paralytic effect that the mantra "we offered them everything and they rejected everything" had on the peace process and in particular on Israeli peace activists who, without irony, blamed the occupied Palestinians for having let them down. Imagine, as the infection took hold, that it dawned on the Israeli people that it was they who in fact had looked the gift-horse in the mouth - that their leaders had scorned the very "generous offer" for which the nation had been yearning for decades: a Palestinian pledge to recognizethe Jewish state within the 1967 borders with agreed, equitable territorial adjustments; an offer for Israel to keep all post-1967 Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem plus a few others elsewhere in the West Bank; for it to assume sovereignty over the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter in the context of an open city of Jerusalem, to be recognized as the capital of both states; and, to top it off, for the Palestinian state to act implicitly as the principal vehicle for Israel's integration into the wider region, which previously had isolated and boycotted it.
PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL - Imagine No Excuses by Tony Klug


Quote:
A slightly different argument suggests that the peace camp faltered because constituency accepted Barak¡¯s claim that Arafat rejected the most generous peace proposal possible at the Camp David summit. The second Intifada was accordingly perceived by the peace movement as an attempt to grab by force what could not be attained through negotiations.

We now know, however, that Barak conceded only 78 percent of the West Bank at Camp David, while 69 Jewish settlements, comprising 85 percent of the settler population, were to remain intact. Major bypass roads were to stay under Israeli control, thus slicing up the Palestinian state-to-be. And some of the most important water reservoirs were to be kept under Israeli sovereignty. Which begs the question: why did most Israelis uncritically accept the claim that the Palestinians are peace refuseniks?
The Israeli Peace Camp in Dark Times - Peace Review 15:1 (2003), 39–45 by Neve Gordon


On the expansionism of Israel during the peace talks, from the same article:

Quote:
Since Rabin signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, Israel has built over 20,000 house units in the Occupied Territories, not counting the construction of new Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The Jewish population living in the territories increased from about 110,000 in 1993 to close to 200,000 in 2000, again not counting the Jews living in occupied East Jerusalem. These numbers suggest that Israel was employing the rhetoric of peace while doing everything possible to create an irreversible situation on the ground, settling thousands of Jews on expropriated Palestinian land. Rabin, Netanyahu, and Barak were not
dissimilar in this respect.


And on Israeli attitudes toward the Peace Talks:
From: The Paradox of Israeli Power by Uri Bar-Joseph - Survival, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 2004–05, pp. 137–156 © The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Quote:
[The use of Israeli military dominance and] [s]imultaneously, the massive build-up of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza aimed at creating a fait accompli, to make it impossible to return these territories in the framework of a further political settlement with Jordan or the Palestinians.

The way in which Israel, under Ariel Sharon, has fought Palestinian terror constitutes the purest manifestation so far of the ¡®security activism¡¯
approach. This has been expressed in two ways. First, although political and military echelons were paying lip service to the need to meet the Palestinian challenge by political means, in reality they caused any diplomatic initiatives aimed at de-escalating the conflict to fail. This was manifested not only by the total rejection of the Palestinian¡¯s recognised leader Yasser Arafat as a partner for negotiations, but also by the rejection of other, more acceptable Palestinian leaders, such as Prime Ministers Abu Mazen and Abu Ala.

Another vivid expression of the disregard for political means is the fact that even when deciding to make what Israel sees as its most significant concession to the Palestinians – Sharon¡¯s plan for withdrawal from Gaza and certain areas in the West Bank – this is to be carried out unilaterally, not via any mutual agreement with the Palestinians.


On the growth of mistrust between the Israeli-US contingent and the Palestinians:
Quote:
In the spring of 2000, a series of missteps by both the Israelis and the Palestinians, as well as by President Clinton, doomed the Camp David
summit. For example, Clinton relayed to Arafat that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak would transfer three occupied Palestinian villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem to Palestinian control, which Arafat then announced to the Palestinian public. When Barak reneged on the promise, Clinton refused to push the Israeli prime minister to honor his pledge.

This was part of a growing distrust Palestinians developed toward the United States and Israel in the peace process. Barak, throughout his tenure, was extremely reluctant to even meet with Arafat. He also refused to withdraw from certain Palestinian lands as part of the third phase of withdrawals previously agreed upon by his rightist predecessor, Benyamin Netanyahu of the Likud Bloc. Nor did the prime minister free many of the Palestinian prisoners he had pledged to release or open the promised four safe passage routes between Palestinian areas that would have allowed Palestinians to move more freely from one point to another within their occupied lands.

Instead, Barak increased the number of closures, thus creating a situation where Palestinians were unable to travel to jobs in Israel, leave the country, or even travel to many areas within Palestinian Authority control. Barak also moved forward with the construction of illegal Jewish settlements at an even faster pace than had his right-wing predecessor. Indeed, during Barak¡¯s 18 months in office, the number of settlers grew by an astounding 12 percent. The Clinton administration neither challenged the dramatic upsurge in construction of new settlements, the closures, the expropriation of land, nor the continued incarceration of Palestinian prisoners.

Clinton¡¯s insistence on jumping to final status negotiations without prior confidence-building measures, such as a freeze on new settlements or the fulfillment of previous pledges to withdraw, led the Palestinians to question the sincerity of both Israel and the United States. Arafat and other Palestinian officials repeatedly warned both Israeli and American officials of the growing resentment among ordinary Palestinians resulting from the dramatic growth of settlements and other Israeli policies. Furthermore, they argued that the previously agreed withdrawals needed to take place before the more difficult issues of the rights of refugees and the status of Jerusalem could be addressed. The Palestinian side certainly contributed to some of the misunderstandings during this period, partly through the lack of effective communication between Arafat and some of his negotiators. However, both the United States and Israel insisted on moving directly to a summit on the final status issues, even though they had only begun to be addressed in earnest during the previous eight weeks of what had been a more than seven-year process.


The fact of the matter is that though, seemingly in the wrong for turning down the Camp David offer, Arafat seemed to be acting in the best interest of the Palestinian peoples. Rather than be bullied into an agreement that had the historical implication of letting Israel off the hook for any previous wrongs, he decided to go with a more reserved and patient tactic. Clinton, wanted it wrapped up soon, since he knew that any break through would have a positive impact for the Democrats in the upcoming elections - he had very little concern for what the Palestinians gained or lost, he was hoping for a moment of political boosting PR.

To villianize one side over the other is to paint yourself into a corner, I would think. The Palestinians are in a very poor situation, they have little independence, and very little hope to stand up to the Israelis, due to previously noted economic and social dependence upon Israel.

Now with Abbas, much more moderate than Arafat running the show, and with Bush much more beligerent than Clinton, I am very worried that the Palestinians are again being painted as the villians if they are seen to drag their heels, while truely only fighting for their survival and their hope for self-determination.
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R. S. Refugee



Joined: 29 Sep 2004
Location: Shangra La, ROK

PostPosted: Sun May 29, 2005 11:51 am    Post subject: Reply with quote

bignate wrote:
Alright, I am ready for another kick at the cat, besides I have some time to kill Razz


Thanks for taking the time to review this history for us. Joo has seen this material presented before in past posts and it seems unlikely that any of his propaganda-induced claims will be affected this time either. And we can most likely count on his brain-washed rhetoric to be repeated over and over.

But there's always hope, so I'm glad you took the time to give us one of your usual crystal-clear presentations.

Cheers.
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Joo Rip Gwa Rhhee



Joined: 25 May 2003

PostPosted: Sun May 29, 2005 2:51 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

BN

Quote:
Arafat has stated on several occasions that with the withfdrawl of Israeli forces with the help of the UN, then the PLO would renounce terror and exist peacefully. This however doesn't really mean anything, since he was never given a chance to follow up on his proposal, since, Israel has never withdrawn and has actually expanded into the territories. Also, more militant Palestinians, such as those within Hamas, have disrupted any progress of this nature.


While he also demands 194 -THE RIGHT OF RETURN

Quote:
How can the US government explain its stand, which acknowledges and recognizes this resolution as it pertains to Israel, while simultaneously rejecting the other half of this resolution as it pertains to the Palestinian state? How can the US government explain its non-commitment to implementing a resolution which it repeatedly sponsored in your esteemed assembly: Resolution 194, which provides for the Palestinians¡¯ right to return to their homeland and property from which they were expelled, or for compensation for those who do not wish to return.



Quote:
Mr President: I hope that it is clear that, just as our Palestinian people are eager to attain their legitimate national right to self-determination and their return, and to secure an end to the occupation of their Palestinian land, of their homeland, our Palestinian people are also eager to safeguard the peace process so as to achieve these goals within the framework of an international conference under UN auspices and in accordance with its Charter and resolutions



http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal5.htm









Quote:
really do you have a source so I can learn more?


Quote:
Quote:
Take the myth of Barak's "generous offer" (Camp David, 2000) and the paralytic effect that the mantra "we offered them everything and they rejected everything" had on the peace process and in particular on Israeli peace activists who, without irony, blamed the occupied Palestinians for having let them down. Imagine, as the infection took hold, that it dawned on the Israeli people that it was they who in fact had looked the gift-horse in the mouth - that their leaders had scorned the very "generous offer" for which the nation had been yearning for decades: a Palestinian pledge to recognizethe Jewish state within the 1967 borders with agreed, equitable territorial adjustments; an offer for Israel to keep all post-1967 Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem plus a few others elsewhere in the West Bank; for it to assume sovereignty over the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter in the context of an open city of Jerusalem, to be recognized as the capital of both states; and, to top it off, for the Palestinian state to act implicitly as the principal vehicle for Israel's integration into the wider region, which previously had isolated and boycotted it.
PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL - Imagine No Excuses by Tony Klug


Interesting CAMP DAVID Summer 2000

Now tell us about TABA and Bill Clintons' offer. DEC 2000

Now

BN:

Quote:
Quote:
A slightly different argument suggests that the peace camp faltered because constituency accepted Barak¡¯s claim that Arafat rejected the most generous peace proposal possible at the Camp David summit. The second Intifada was accordingly perceived by the peace movement as an attempt to grab by force what could not be attained through negotiations.

We now know, however, that Barak conceded only 78 percent of the West Bank at Camp David, while 69 Jewish settlements, comprising 85 percent of the settler population, were to remain intact. Major bypass roads were to stay under Israeli control, thus slicing up the Palestinian state-to-be. And some of the most important water reservoirs were to be kept under Israeli sovereignty. Which begs the question: why did most Israelis uncritically accept the claim that the Palestinians are peace refuseniks?
The Israeli Peace Camp in Dark Times - Peace Review 15:1 (2003), 39–45 by Neve Gordon


More Camp David.

TABA , BILL CLINTONS OFFER?

Quote:
On the expansionism of Israel during the peace talks, from the same article:

Quote:
Since Rabin signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, Israel has built over 20,000 house units in the Occupied Territories, not counting the construction of new Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The Jewish population living in the territories increased from about 110,000 in 1993 to close to 200,000 in 2000, again not counting the Jews living in occupied East Jerusalem. These numbers suggest that Israel was employing the rhetoric of peace while doing everything possible to create an irreversible situation on the ground, settling thousands of Jews on expropriated Palestinian land. Rabin, Netanyahu, and Barak were not
dissimilar in this respect.


And on Israeli attitudes toward the Peace Talks:
From: The Paradox of Israeli Power by Uri Bar-Joseph - Survival, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter 2004–05, pp. 137–156 © The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Quote:
[The use of Israeli military dominance and] [s]imultaneously, the massive build-up of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza aimed at creating a fait accompli, to make it impossible to return these territories in the framework of a further political settlement with Jordan or the Palestinians.




Both sides were in violtion of Oslo, as I said before in TABA and BILL CLINTONS OFFER most of those settlements would have been gone.

BIGNATE
Quote:
The way in which Israel, under Ariel Sharon, has fought Palestinian terror constitutes the purest manifestation so far of the ¡®security activism¡¯
approach. This has been expressed in two ways. First, although political and military echelons were paying lip service to the need to meet the Palestinian challenge by political means, in reality they caused any diplomatic initiatives aimed at de-escalating the conflict to fail. This was manifested not only by the total rejection of the Palestinian¡¯s recognised leader Yasser Arafat as a partner for negotiations, but also by the rejection of other, more acceptable Palestinian leaders, such as Prime Ministers Abu Mazen and Abu Ala.



It was understandable that Sharon reject Arafat. However he should be doing much more w/ abu Mazen.


Quote:
Another vivid expression of the disregard for political means is the fact that even when deciding to make what Israel sees as its most significant concession to the Palestinians – Sharon¡¯s plan for withdrawal from Gaza and certain areas in the West Bank – this is to be carried out unilaterally, not via any mutual agreement with the Palestinians.


That much I agree with, especially that Arafat now is out of the picture.


BigNate.
Quote:
On the growth of mistrust between the Israeli-US contingent and the Palestinians:




Quote:
In the spring of 2000, a series of missteps by both the Israelis and the Palestinians, as well as by President Clinton, doomed the Camp David
summit. For example, Clinton relayed to Arafat that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak would transfer three occupied Palestinian villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem to Palestinian control, which Arafat then announced to the Palestinian public. When Barak reneged on the promise, Clinton refused to push the Israeli prime minister to honor his pledge.

This was part of a growing distrust Palestinians developed toward the United States and Israel in the peace process. Barak, throughout his tenure, was extremely reluctant to even meet with Arafat. He also refused to withdraw from certain Palestinian lands as part of the third phase of withdrawals previously agreed upon by his rightist predecessor, Benyamin Netanyahu of the Likud Bloc. Nor did the prime minister free many of the Palestinian prisoners he had pledged to release or open the promised four safe passage routes between Palestinian areas that would have allowed Palestinians to move more freely from one point to another within their occupied lands.

Instead, Barak increased the number of closures, thus creating a situation where Palestinians were unable to travel to jobs in Israel, leave the country, or even travel to many areas within Palestinian Authority control. Barak also moved forward with the construction of illegal Jewish settlements at an even faster pace than had his right-wing predecessor. Indeed, during Barak¡¯s 18 months in office, the number of settlers grew by an astounding 12 percent. The Clinton administration neither challenged the dramatic upsurge in construction of new settlements, the closures, the expropriation of land, nor the continued incarceration of Palestinian prisoners.

Clinton¡¯s insistence on jumping to final status negotiations without prior confidence-building measures, such as a freeze on new settlements or the fulfillment of previous pledges to withdraw, led the Palestinians to question the sincerity of both Israel and the United States. Arafat and other Palestinian officials repeatedly warned both Israeli and American officials of the growing resentment among ordinary Palestinians resulting from the dramatic growth of settlements and other Israeli policies. Furthermore, they argued that the previously agreed withdrawals needed to take place before the more difficult issues of the rights of refugees and the status of Jerusalem could be addressed. The Palestinian side certainly contributed to some of the misunderstandings during this period, partly through the lack of effective communication between Arafat and some of his negotiators. However, both the United States and Israel insisted on moving directly to a summit on the final status issues, even though they had only begun to be addressed in earnest during the previous eight weeks of what had been a more than seven-year process.
[/quote]




Quote:
The fact of the matter is that though, seemingly in the wrong for turning down the Camp David offer, Arafat seemed to be acting in the best interest of the Palestinian peoples. Rather than be bullied into an agreement that had the historical implication of letting Israel off the hook for any previous wrongs, he decided to go with a more reserved and patient tactic. Clinton, wanted it wrapped up soon, since he knew that any break through would have a positive impact for the Democrats in the upcoming elections - he had very little concern for what the Palestinians gained or lost, he was hoping for a moment of po



Both Clinton and Barak didn't have time, and though Barak built more settlements they would have been gone as part of a final agreement.

Quote:
Why did Arafat not accept the chance to get rid of them.
To villianize one side over the other is to paint yourself into a corner, I would think. The Palestinians are in a very poor situation, they have little independence, and very little hope to stand up to the Israelis, due to previously noted economic and social dependence upon Israel.


I am not demonizing one side just Arafat. Who deserves such and worse.

Quote:
Now with Abbas, much more moderate than Arafat running the show, and with Bush much more beligerent than Clinton, I am very worried that the Palestinians are again being painted as the villians if they are seen to drag their heels, while truely only fighting for their survival and their hope for self-determination.



I think Abbas is much better and credible than Arafat.


Last edited by Joo Rip Gwa Rhhee on Sun May 29, 2005 3:35 pm; edited 6 times in total
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Joo Rip Gwa Rhhee



Joined: 25 May 2003

PostPosted: Sun May 29, 2005 2:56 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Quote:
Thanks for taking the time to review this history for us. Joo has seen this material presented before in past posts and it seems unlikely that any of his propaganda-induced claims will be affected this time either. And we can most likely count on his brain-washed rhetoric to be repeated over and over.


RSR I got some questions for you too.


DID Arafat demand Right of Return in 1988 or not?

Did both sides violate Oslo or just one side?



RSR tell us not only about Camp David but Taba and Bill Clintons offer.

You post a lot of article so how about answering the above questions?

Quote:
But there's always hope, so I'm glad you took the time to give us one of your usual crystal-clear presentations.


BigNate is knows a lot and - if I may say he is a lot less one sided than you are.
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bignate



Joined: 30 Apr 2003
Location: Hell's Ditch

PostPosted: Sun May 29, 2005 4:06 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Quote:
Now tell us about TABA and Bill Clintons' offer. DEC 2000


Ifigured you would come to that so I just dug up some older stuff from this thread. Heck I spent a lot of time researching it, why not?

In Oct of 2004 Joo wrote:
You are talking of Camp David . What about Taba and Bill Clintons offer?

Please tell me about them?



Quote:
Sorry Joo, most people consider them an extension of each other and besides what happened at Camp David had a great influence upon the outcome of Taba and was a primary reason behind the 11th hour offer Clinton made as well.

Ok, let's talk about Taba - I'll play ball . Taba, another conference that was entered in with great exhuberence in the begining, yet in the end fizzled when things seemed to be going well...

I thought I might start with a favourite publication of yours...
Quote:

Quote:
New York Times
July 26, 2001

Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed
Many Now Agree That All the Parties, Not Just Arafat, Were to Blame
By DEBORAH SONTAG

...Mr. Arafat did eventually authorize his negotiators to engage in talks in Taba that used the Clinton proposal as a foundation. Despite reports to the contrary in Israel, however, Mr. Arafat never turned down 77 percent of the West Bank at Taba, as many Israelis hold. The negotiations were suspended by Israel because elections were imminent and the pressure of Israeli public opinion against the talks could not be resisted, said Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was Israel's foreign minister at the time.

Still, the details of a permanent peace agreement were as clear at Taba as they ever have been, most participants said. So afterward, United Nations and European diplomats scrambled to convene a summit meeting in Stockholm. There, they believed, Mr. Arafat who is known to make decisions only under extreme deadline pressure was prepared to deliver a breakthrough concession on the central issue of the fate of Palestinian refugees, and a compromise was possible on Jerusalem.

For a variety of reasons, the summit meeting never took place. In the Israeli elections in February, Mr. Barak lost resoundingly to Mr. Sharon. It was then that peace moves froze -- not six months earlier at Camp David.


Both the Israeli's and the Palestinians were getting tired of the way that the peace process was going. The Israelis did not believe that the Palestinians were educating their populace for peace, were trying to villify Israel as a nation, and did not want to wait for the lengthy process to run its course. The Palestinians fed up with the way that they were treated at Camp David were extremely suspicious of Israeli promises and were fed up with the US-Israeli partnership.

Besides,with the obstinance that was exhibited by the Israelis at Camp David and the sweetening of the deal at Taba - many of the Palestinians were left wondering what more would Israel offer in the future?

Another problem at Taba was due to the timing of the conference - the election that Barak was soundly defeated in - put undue political pressure on him not to seem so giving to the Palestinians and led to a stagnation of the conference.


Quote:
Both sides, in recent interviews, wondered aloud why Mr. Clinton could not have presented his peace proposal at Camp David or immediately afterward. In late December, when he finally did so, the timing was very tight. Mr. Clinton was due to leave the presidency on Jan. 20, and Mr. Barak faced elections on Feb. 6.

The proposal offered more to the Palestinians than what was on the table at Camp David, but they initially responded with skepticism. The plan was too vague, they said. In the midst once more of a violent relationship with Israel, they were not emotionally poised to abide by the political timetables of others and to rush into a fuzzy deal, they said. (Sontag, 2001)



It just seemed like neither of the main parties (Arafat or Barak) were into the negotiations because of this timing...

Quote:
Though Barak was in close phone contact with the negotiation through Gilead Sher, the negotiaions often developed thier own momentum. They moved seriously and quickly into solving problems, and many on each side seem to have been stimulated by the seriousness of the other side. This created a sense of optimism among at least some of the negotiators that seems not to have been true for Arafat or Barak. Taba can thus be seen as a tug of war between Barak at one end of the rope and some of the negotiators on the other: on Monday and Tuesday the negotiatiors were winning, on Tuesday afternoon Barak pulled back; on Thursday and Friday the negotiators gained ground, and on Saturday Barak, with Arafat's apparent concurrence, ended the negotiation. (Matz, 2003, p. 94)


Anyways, again Joo, there were faults on both sides and in the end, both parties walked away due to their own reasons. There were concessions made by both sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, but still neither was ready to accept each other's terms - because each was equally skeptical of the other's motives.

Source: Why Did Taba End? By: Matz, David. Palestine - Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture, 2003, Vol. 10 Issue 4, p92, 7p, 2bw; (AN 12598308)


As far as the right to return, it was a historical stance, one the Palestinians and its Arab neighbours felt was core to any resolution - as it appears now it is not economically or demographically feesible, however, it is still core to the Palestinian psyche. It was guaranteed under a UN resolution and Arafat was loathe to let it go (and I already know that a UN General Assembly Resolution is not legally binding... but it doesn't make it any less right - in its historical context).

Joo wrote:
I think Abbas is much better and credible than Arafat.

Perhaps, but he can also be concidered somewhat overly concilliatory to the US-Israeli agendas. I feel that although he is quite intelligent and politically smart, he may show little concern for the common Palestinian People (not that Arafat did either) and their wishes and goals.

I don't say that Arafat wasn't involved with terror or that he was easy to deal with in a political context, but he fought tooth and nail for everything that he believed that the Palestinians deserved and were entitled to. He did cause breakdownd in negotiations, as did his Israeli counterparts. He may have also perhaps, prevented the Palestinians from entering into agreements that would have left them more destitute and emprisoned than they are now.

Both the normal Israeli and Palestinian citizen are tired: tired of the rhetoric, tired of the fear, tired of the war, tired of fighting - that will be the real cause of peace in the Middle East.
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Joo Rip Gwa Rhhee



Joined: 25 May 2003

PostPosted: Sun May 29, 2005 4:30 pm    Post subject: Reply with quote

Quote:

Ifigured you would come to that so I just dug up some older stuff from this thread. Heck I spent a lot of time researching it, why not?


OK.




Quote:
Sorry Joo, most people consider them an extension of each other and besides what happened at Camp David had a great influence upon the outcome of Taba and was a primary reason behind the 11th hour offer Clinton made as well.


Look Arafat had months to come with an offer for right of return.

Quote:
Ok, let's talk about Taba - I'll play ball . Taba, another conference that was entered in with great exhuberence in the begining, yet in the end fizzled when things seemed to be going well...


He still could have taken the Bill Clinton offer.

At Taba Arafat was still demanding a large right of return




Quote:
New York Times
July 26, 2001

Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed
Many Now Agree That All the Parties, Not Just Arafat, Were to Blame
By DEBORAH SONTAG

...Mr. Arafat did eventually authorize his negotiators to engage in talks in Taba that used the Clinton proposal as a foundation. Despite reports to the contrary in Israel, however, Mr. Arafat never turned down 77 percent of the West Bank at Taba, as many Israelis hold. The negotiations were suspended by Israel because elections were imminent and the pressure of Israeli public opinion against the talks could not be resisted, said Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was Israel's foreign minister at the time.

Still, the details of a permanent peace agreement were as clear at Taba as they ever have been, most participants said. So afterward, United Nations and European diplomats scrambled to convene a summit meeting in Stockholm. There, they believed, Mr. Arafat who is known to make decisions only under extreme deadline pressure was prepared to deliver a breakthrough concession on the central issue of the fate of Palestinian refugees, and a compromise was possible on Jerusalem.


where is the concession on Palestinian refugees? He didn't do it then, he never did.


Quote:
For a variety of reasons, the summit meeting never took place. In the Israeli elections in February, Mr. Barak lost resoundingly to Mr. Sharon. It was then that peace moves froze -- not six months earlier at Camp David.


Ok

Quote:
Both the Israeli's and the Palestinians were getting tired of the way that the peace process was going. The Israelis did not believe that the Palestinians were educating their populace for peace, were trying to villify Israel as a nation, and did not want to wait for the lengthy process to run its course. The Palestinians fed up with the way that they were treated at Camp David were extremely suspicious of Israeli promises and were fed up with the US-Israeli partnership.




That may be so, they also know what issues are make or
Quote:
break.

Besides,with the obstinance that was exhibited by the Israelis at Camp David and the sweetening of the deal at Taba - many of the Palestinians were left wondering what more would Israel offer in the future?


Lets remember no counter offer by Arafat at Camp David.

So Isreal is at fault cause the Palestinians saw a softening or weakening of Israels position.

How about Arafat raised his demands when he saw it.

In otherwords Barak is wrong for taking a hard stance at Camp David but Arafat was just negotioning the best deal when he got tougher?

Quote:
Another problem at Taba was due to the timing of the conference - the election that Barak was soundly defeated in - put undue political pressure on him not to seem so giving to the Palestinians and led to a stagnation of the conference.


OK


Quote:
Both sides, in recent interviews, wondered aloud why Mr. Clinton could not have presented his peace proposal at Camp David or immediately afterward. In late December, when he finally did so, the timing was very tight. Mr. Clinton was due to leave the presidency on Jan. 20, and Mr. Barak faced elections on Feb. 6.



At Camp David that was the opening offer from Israel - where was Arafats counter offer?

Quote:
The proposal offered more to the Palestinians than what was on the table at Camp David, but they initially responded with skepticism. The plan was too vague, they said. In the midst once more of a violent relationship with Israel, they were not emotionally poised to abide by the political timetables of others and to rush into a fuzzy deal, they said. (Sontag, 2001)


They could have taken the right of return off the table.


Quote:
It just seemed like neither of the main parties (Arafat or Barak) were into the negotiations because of this timing...


Barak said yes to Clintons offer Arafat didn't. Nor did Arafat come in w/ a counter offer.

Quote:
Though Barak was in close phone contact with the negotiation through Gilead Sher, the negotiaions often developed thier own momentum. They moved seriously and quickly into solving problems, and many on each side seem to have been stimulated by the seriousness of the other side. This created a sense of optimism among at least some of the negotiators that seems not to have been true for Arafat or Barak. Taba can thus be seen as a tug of war between Barak at one end of the rope and some of the negotiators on the other: on Monday and Tuesday the negotiatiors were winning, on Tuesday afternoon Barak pulled back; on Thursday and Friday the negotiators gained ground, and on Saturday Barak, with Arafat's apparent concurrence, ended the negotiation. (Matz, 2003, p. 94)
[/quote]

OK

Quote:
Anyways, again Joo, there were faults on both sides and in the end, both parties walked away due to their own reasons. There were concessions made by both sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, but still neither was ready to accept each other's terms - because each was equally skeptical of the other's motives.


If there is no concession on Right of Return then there were no concessions.

Besides what else other than ROR could Israel offer in Bill Clintons plan?



Quote:
As far as the right to return, it was a historical stance, one the Palestinians and its Arab neighbours felt was core to any resolution - as it appears now it is not economically or demographically feesible, however, it is still core to the Palestinian psyche. It was guaranteed under a UN resolution and Arafat was loathe to let it go (and I already know that a UN General Assembly Resolution is not legally binding... but it doesn't make it any less right - in its historical context).


well then , Arab Jews persecuted also have a case.

And Israel is offering Arab refugees a lot better deal than its enemies have offered Arab Jews who were persecuted.

But more than that if there is Right of Return then there is nothing for Israel.



Joo wrote:
I think Abbas is much better and credible than Arafat.



Quote:
Perhaps, but he can also be concidered somewhat overly concilliatory to the US-Israeli agendas. I feel that although he is quite intelligent and politically smart, he may show little concern for the common Palestinian People (not that Arafat did either) and their wishes and goals.


He is a guy that wants to make a deal , not just look for ways to knock out Israel.

Quote:
I don't say that Arafat wasn't involved with terror or that he was easy to deal with in a political context, but he fought tooth and nail for everything that he believed that the Palestinians deserved and were entitled to. He did cause breakdownd in negotiations, as did his Israeli counterparts. He may have also perhaps, prevented the Palestinians from entering into agreements that would have left them more destitute and emprisoned than they are now.


What was wrong w/ Clintons offer.

You mean they would be worse under Bill Clintons offer or even Camp David then they are under Israeli occupation?

He should have come up w/ an offer or taken Clintons offer.



Quote:
Both the normal Israeli and Palestinian citizen are tired: tired of the rhetoric, tired of the fear, tired of the war, tired of fighting - that will be the real cause of peace in the Middle East.


I agree with you.

but if you say that both sides are at fault then why don't you say that both sides are at fault for the occupation?
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