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[Joo Rip Gwa Rhhee]

July 30, 2007
Op-Ed Contributor
A War We Just Might Win
By MICHAEL E. O�HANLON and KENNETH M. POLLACK
Washington

VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration�s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place.

Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration�s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily �victory� but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.

After the furnace-like heat, the first thing you notice when you land in Baghdad is the morale of our troops. In previous trips to Iraq we often found American troops angry and frustrated � many sensed they had the wrong strategy, were using the wrong tactics and were risking their lives in pursuit of an approach that could not work.

Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.

Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services � electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation � to the people. Yet in each place, operations had been appropriately tailored to the specific needs of the community. As a result, civilian fatality rates are down roughly a third since the surge began � though they remain very high, underscoring how much more still needs to be done.

In Ramadi, for example, we talked with an outstanding Marine captain whose company was living in harmony in a complex with a (largely Sunni) Iraqi police company and a (largely Shiite) Iraqi Army unit. He and his men had built an Arab-style living room, where he met with the local Sunni sheiks � all formerly allies of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups � who were now competing to secure his friendship.

In Baghdad�s Ghazaliya neighborhood, which has seen some of the worst sectarian combat, we walked a street slowly coming back to life with stores and shoppers. The Sunni residents were unhappy with the nearby police checkpoint, where Shiite officers reportedly abused them, but they seemed genuinely happy with the American soldiers and a mostly Kurdish Iraqi Army company patrolling the street. The local Sunni militia even had agreed to confine itself to its compound once the Americans and Iraqi units arrived.

We traveled to the northern cities of Tal Afar and Mosul. This is an ethnically rich area, with large numbers of Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. American troop levels in both cities now number only in the hundreds because the Iraqis have stepped up to the plate. Reliable police officers man the checkpoints in the cities, while Iraqi Army troops cover the countryside. A local mayor told us his greatest fear was an overly rapid American departure from Iraq. All across the country, the dependability of Iraqi security forces over the long term remains a major question mark.

But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed. The American high command assesses that more than three-quarters of the Iraqi Army battalion commanders in Baghdad are now reliable partners (at least for as long as American forces remain in Iraq).

In addition, far more Iraqi units are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Iraqi Army�s highly effective Third Infantry Division started out as overwhelmingly Kurdish in 2005. Today, it is 45 percent Shiite, 28 percent Kurdish, and 27 percent Sunni Arab.

In the past, few Iraqi units could do more than provide a few �jundis� (soldiers) to put a thin Iraqi face on largely American operations. Today, in only a few sectors did we find American commanders complaining that their Iraqi formations were useless � something that was the rule, not the exception, on a previous trip to Iraq in late 2005.

The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus�s determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave.

In war, sometimes it�s important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr�s Mahdi Army.

These groups have tried to impose Shariah law, brutalized average Iraqis to keep them in line, killed important local leaders and seized young women to marry off to their loyalists. The result has been that in the last six months Iraqis have begun to turn on the extremists and turn to the Americans for security and help. The most important and best-known example of this is in Anbar Province, which in less than six months has gone from the worst part of Iraq to the best (outside the Kurdish areas). Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor.

Another surprise was how well the coalition�s new Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working. Wherever we found a fully staffed team, we also found local Iraqi leaders and businessmen cooperating with it to revive the local economy and build new political structures. Although much more needs to be done to create jobs, a new emphasis on microloans and small-scale projects was having some success where the previous aid programs often built white elephants.

In some places where we have failed to provide the civilian manpower to fill out the reconstruction teams, the surge has still allowed the military to fashion its own advisory groups from battalion, brigade and division staffs. We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life.

Outside Baghdad, one of the biggest factors in the progress so far has been the efforts to decentralize power to the provinces and local governments. But more must be done. For example, the Iraqi National Police, which are controlled by the Interior Ministry, remain mostly a disaster. In response, many towns and neighborhoods are standing up local police forces, which generally prove more effective, less corrupt and less sectarian. The coalition has to force the warlords in Baghdad to allow the creation of neutral security forces beyond their control.

In the end, the situation in Iraq remains grave. In particular, we still face huge hurdles on the political front. Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation � or at least accommodation � are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines.

How much longer should American troops keep fighting and dying to build a new Iraq while Iraqi leaders fail to do their part? And how much longer can we wear down our forces in this mission? These haunting questions underscore the reality that the surge cannot go on forever. But there is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008.

Michael E. O�Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/opinion/30pollack.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin

[dmbfan]

Good posting.

[Don Gately]

[coler651]

This article is very interesting, considering the Brookings Institutue is an "progressive" liberal think tank

[Don Gately]

[ddeubel]

O�Hanlon I've read for a long time and he's so far up the military's ass, he doesn't know the difference between bazooka gum and a real bazooka.

This is all part of the "counter" spin -- to make it seem like it is Iraq's fault for the failure and thus, open up a way to say WE WON! And in doing so give the democratic party leverage -- we both brought the boys home and won!!!

How can you believe anything an "institute" is saying? This is the biggest problem, all these types puffing up what isn't. What started it and now they are trying to finish it in the same spirit.

DD

[safeblad]

yes. 'win' in military terms....maybe.

Everyone is a loser here, apart from the guy with his arab style living room. Obviously.

[Joo Rip Gwa Rhhee]

[ddeubel]

Joo,

I could names a slew of Rep Senators, Lugar/Chuck Hagel to name two. As well as Ron Paul. In other political areas, Jack Walters and James Leach. Kristof, a journalist. Many more.... Also note O'Hanlon is a Democrat. Just goes to show that U.S. politics isn't partisan, it is simply where the right career path (money) is. I won't go on because this shouldn't be the point.

The point is that these kinds of articles are just played for their "supper" and mere pap. This is the trouble with an insular America that gets its news through ticker tape, manipulated and partisan articles and lobbyists. It misinforms policy and creates a reality that is neither "real" nor "human".

Iraq won't change because of these troop levels. Nor even 500,000. It is just sticking a thumb in a dike. Even in this calm July - far more U.S. troops have died this July than previously. Humanitarian conditions far worse on all levels than under Sadaam (water, electricity, schooling, security). Sure they can get twinkies, but do they really need them?

This is all part of a set up. This article has been playing over and over like propaganda on CNN the last few days. Reminds me of the megaphones in all those Russian cities....long ago but not so long ago.

DD

[Joo Rip Gwa Rhhee]

[Alias]

Both writers supported the invasion of Iraq. They were only critical of the tactics that were being used.

[Adventurer]

I, for one, never supported the invasion, but I also oppose the Democrats (and some Republicans) who want to withdraw. They voted for the war, and they cannot simply just abandon Iraq so quickly. Iraq should be given at least one more year and up to two to stabilize. I am sorry for those want to withdraw quickly, but war is not a game and whether you believe you or misled or not, the die was cast, and a war is not a game, and soldiers die, and it costs a lot of money. It would be very damaging to American credibility to withdraw now. Those saying well there is already a civil war, don't understand that it could get worse. I think too many people are making this war personal in the wrong way and view it simply as George Bush's war. I frankly do not like Bush, wouldn't mind seeing him impeached, but that would be a waste of time, energy, and wouldn't accomplish anything, but the war has been launched, there is much at stake in Iraq. This isn't just about Iraq.

[Joo Rip Gwa Rhhee]

[twg]

Just like Korea in 1953!

[Saxiif]