Korean Job Discussion Forums

[edwardcatflap]

[T-J]

There have always been four scenarios for major conflict restarting on the peninsula:

1. N Korean leadership thinks it has an advantage and can win.
* almost all discount this as a realistic possibility

2. N Korean leadership thinks its survival is a lost cause.
* China to this point has maintained the status quo

3. Small boarder incident leads to a spiraling escalation.
* CFC policy in the past has prevented this from happening

4. The U.S. decides that it has a tactical necessity to instigate change
* to this point the U.S. like China has chosen the status quo

The 'DMZ War in the late sixties which included the USS Pueblo capture and the shooting down of a U.S. surveillance aircraft in international airspace, the axe murder in '76, and the '94 tensions all ranked higher than the current situation on terms of tension, rhetoric, and posturing. So if all things were equal I'd say 'nothing to worry about.'

*Unfortunately three of the stabilizing factors from above are in question.
2. China appears to be shifting its policy of support to some degree as it becomes more dependent on mainstream global economies.
3. ROK and CFC policy has shifted in terms of containment and escalation avoidance being a priority in response to low intensity clashes.
4. The nuclear issue is the line in the sand for the U.S. That line got a lot closer today;
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/12/world/asia/north-korea-may-have-nuclear-missile-capability-us-agency-says.html?smid=tw-bna&_r=0

What does all this mean? Are we heading toward a conflict? I doubt it. I really do. But there are too many factors in a dynamic situation to laugh off the possibility. I'll continue with my life as normal, but I do have contingency plans, am prepared, and am vigilant.

Final word, those that leave early if there is a conflict are smart, those that leave and there is no conflict are able to return, those that leave late are neither.

[hiamnotcool]

There really is no reason to stay unless you have immediate family here. A fluent Korean speaker might be able to contribute something, but as a foreigner that can't communicate properly we would be nothing but a burden. I think the majority of locals here would feel much better knowing no one has to check in and make sure we are ok. I know significant others would probably prefer to know that their partner is safe than continuously think about whether or not you are lost or in the wrong place at the wrong time. I honestly wouldn't want to leave, but if the embassy calls for an evacuation I will do what is most convenient for everyone and get out. Be honest with yourselves, we wouldn't have much to offer.

Now leaving because of escalated rhetoric from the North? Yeah, no.

[Quack Addict]

[World Traveler]

[T-J]

^^

You're taking me slightly out of context. My point is that during those periods there were actual shooting incidents and U.S. servicemen were killed and captured. People point to these and say 'nothing happened then so...'

I went on to say that one or more of the underlying reasons for avoiding escalation during those periods has changed so any comparison is apples to oranges.

On the surface the current tensions have not reached the levels of the past, but taking into account the underlying changes, I think dismissing the current situation as 'more of the same' is a mistake.

[le-paul]

[diver]

I have to agree with TJ on this one. Just because the US commander says he can't recall a more tense time than this, doesn't mean there wasn't one (or more).

North Korea actually attacked South Korea not too long ago. I bet the people of Yeongpyeong Island are less tense right now than they were then (that's not to say they are relaxed right now either).

Also, look up Operation Paul Bunyon.

Forces

Operation Paul Bunyan was carried out on August 21 at 7 AM, three days after the [axe murders]. A convoy of 23 American and South Korean vehicles ("Task Force Vierra", named for Lieutenant Colonel Victor S. Vierra, commander of the United States Army Support Group) drove into the JSA without warning to the North Koreans, who had one observation post manned at that hour. In the vehicles were two eight-man teams of military engineers (from the 2nd Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division) equipped with chain-saws to cut down the tree.

These teams were accompanied by two 30-man security platoons from the Joint Security Force, who were armed with pistols and axe handles. The 2nd Platoon would secure the northern entrance to the JSA via the Bridge of No Return, while the 3rd Platoon would secure the southern edge of the area.

Concurrently, a team from B Company, commanded by Captain Walter Seifried, had activated the detonation systems for the charges on Freedom Bridge and had the 165mm main gun of the M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle aimed mid-span to ensure that the bridge would fall should the order be given for its destruction. Also B Company, supporting E Company (Bridge), were building M4T6 rafts on the Imjin River should the situation require emergency evacuation by that route.

In addition, a 64-man South Korean special forces company accompanied them, armed with clubs and trained in Tae Kwon Do, supposedly without firearms. However, once they parked their trucks near the Bridge of No Return, they started throwing out the sandbags that lined the truck bottoms, and handing out M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers that had been concealed below.[2] Several of the special forces men also had Claymore mines strapped to their chests with the firing mechanism in their hands, and were shouting at the North Koreans to cross the bridge.[14][15]

A U.S. infantry company in 20 utility helicopters and 7 Cobra attack helicopters circled behind them. Behind these helicopters, B-52 Stratofortresses escorted by U.S. F-4 Phantom IIs from Kunsan Air Base and South Korean F-5 Freedom Fighters were visible flying across the sky at high altitude. At Taegu Air Base, F-111 bombers of the 430th Tactical Fighter Squadron out of Mountain Home Air Force Base, were stationed. The aircraft carrier Midway task force had also been moved to a station just offshore.[6]

In addition, near the edges of the DMZ, many more heavily armed U.S. and South Korean infantry, artillery including the Second Battalion, 71st Air Defense Regiment armed with HAWK missiles, and armor were waiting to back up the special operations team. Bases near the DMZ were prepared for demolition in the case of a military response. The defense condition (DEFCON) was elevated on order of Gen. Stillwell, as recounted in Colonel De LaTeur's research pap