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Kuros
Joined: 27 Apr 2004
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 Posted: Fri Sep 23, 2005 5:15 am Post subject: Shi'ite Autonomy, Moqtada, and the Looming Civil War in Iraq |
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Asia Times
A good comprehensive article on the division amongst the Shi'a and how it might spin Iraq into a civil war.
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The US and that man Muqtada again
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - Everybody seems to be getting selfish these days in Iraq.
The Shi'ites are demanding autonomy in southern Iraq, which, if it happens, will give them control of about 80% of the country's oil. The Kurds have demanded and maintained their autonomy in northern Iraq. They are demanding expansion and Kurdish authority over the oil-rich town of Kirkuk. The Sunnis, meanwhile, are left in the middle, fearing a civil war and begging for a unified Iraq. They have little say because they have been snubbed by everybody; they remind the world of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and they added to their misery by boycotting the elections of January 2005.
What is happening in Iraq today is a recipe for a very ugly and bloody civil war. If it breaks out, it will cost plenty of Iraqi lives,
more lives even than those lost in the American-led war on Iraq and its aftermath. To date, close to 30,000 people have been killed in 30 months of violence since March 2003.
While many accuse the Kurds of triggering problems by insisting on an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, the real problem lies with the Iraqi Shi'ites of the south. Everybody has accepted Kurdish autonomy in the north, saying that the Kurds are in fact different from Arabs, in ethnicity, language, history and traditions. That cannot be said of the Shi'ites, who are both Iraqi and Arab. Nothing about the Shi'ites entitles them to an autonomous south. They have no unique language, race, ethnicity or history that qualifies them for a mini-state. The only reason for their ambitious demand is the greed for power among a specific group of Shi'ites, along with a desire for more oil, and an apparent commitment to Shi'ite nationalism rather than Iraqi nationalism.
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who heads the largest Shi'ite coalition in the Iraqi National Assembly, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, urged thousands of supporters in the holy city of Najaf in August to demand autonomy for the Shi'ites, saying: "We see the need to form one autonomous zone in the center and south of Iraq. We must not miss this opportunity."
A loyalist to the mullahs of Tehran, Hakim spent many years in exile in Iran during the years of Saddam's dictatorship, and apparently his Shi'ite nationalism is stronger than his Iraqi nationalism. This can be understood for the Kurds, but not for an Arab like Hakim. As the crowds in Najaf cheered in support, his right-hand man, Hadi al-Ameri, the head of the Shi'ite militia, the Badr Brigade, nodded in support.
Ameri, who can control the Shi'ite street and mobilize armed support for Shi'ite autonomy, backed Hakim's statement, saying: "We have to insist on forming one region in the south, otherwise we will regret it. They are trying to deprive the Shi'ites." If implemented, a powerful and oil-rich Shi'ite mini-state will be formed inside Iraq, parallel to the oil-rich Kurdish one.
To date, the US has not been encouraging, saying that an autonomous south contradicts Washington's vision of a united and democratic Iraq. But, to say the least, the US has done little to thwart Shi'ite ambitions. The only ones who have seriously been lobbying against an autonomous south have been the Sunnis, arguing that this would destroy the modern Iraq that has existed since the 1920s. One Sunni member of the constitutional assembly said, "We were shocked and very upset when we heard this news. Nobody has been listening to us when we warned that federalism would lead to the disintegration of Iraq, and now the Shi'ites have shown what they really want." Another Sunni, Mishan al-Jibouri, told Qatar-based al-Jazeera TV, "This will create civil war. We will never let it happen."
Some argue that this is not a genuine Shi'ite demand, and Hakim is using it to make any other Shi'ite demands bearable. Anything short of autonomy will be welcomed and accepted by the Iraqis, seeing it as a big improvement on dismembering Iraq. Even the Shi'ite premier, Ibrahim Jaafari, is opposed to such an idea, with his spokesman declaring that Shi'ite autonomy in the south is "unacceptable".
Divisions in the Shi'ite community
The one person to stand up and criticize proposed Shi'ite autonomy, ironically, is Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the younger leaders of the Shi'ite resistance. In 2003-2004 he led his own war against the Americans, before the Sunni insurgency increased its war against the US military.
Initially, many wrote him off as a wild young man who was a product of the hour and who would fade away once the Americans crushed his military movement. That has not been the case, to the surprise of many, and Muqtada waited, joining the political process in January this year only because Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the powerful Shi'ite cleric, said that voting was a religious duty for every Iraqi.
Another reason, naturally, is Sadr's desire to be part of the political process and not be left out in the cold as other parties and politicians assemble to create the political order in the post-Saddam era. Today, he emerges as one of the loudest opponents of Shi'ite autonomy, arguing that there is no need for a Shi'ite region since Shi'ites are bound by religion rather than race, region or ethnicity. He states that they are part of the Arab world and the Islamic world and should not, under any circumstance, be given a mini-state of their own in Iraq.
Those to welcome his words, in addition to his Shi'ite followers, were not surprisingly the Sunnis. First, they have praised his commitment to Iraq and its historical borders, and second, they see that if Muqtada decides to wage war against the political system if Shi'ite autonomy is implemented, he would help them in the insurgency, which since 2004 has been headed by Sunnis. A Sunni-Shi'ite movement would surely not only defeat any federal projects in Iraq, but also inflict heavy pain on the Americans. It would destroy a promise made by US Vice President Dick Cheney earlier this year, saying that the war in Iraq would be won by 2009 and that the insurgency was in its "last throes".
Muqtada, still in his early 30s, is likely to emerge as the most important Shi'ite figure in the years to come. He is the man to be watched in the new Iraq. His influence will eventually outflank that of Hakim, but he will remain a controllable rebel, always willing to obey the orders of Sistani. All reports in the US media about him being in conflict with Sistani are false. Sistani might disagree with Muqtada's young, radical and sometimes wild approach to politics, seeing him as an amateur, but he has respect for Muqtada, and likewise Muqtada obeys his orders.
For years, the Muqtada family has served as a counterweight to that the Hakim family in Shi'ite politics. Muqtada inherited the mantle from his father, the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was killed by Saddam in Najaf in 1999. Muqtada's father-in-law was also killed by Saddam in 1980. Authorities in 1999 denied involvement in the assassination, fearing the wrath of the Shi'ites, and instead implicated two men in the murder and quickly had them executed to wrap up the case.
Unlike his father, Muqtada is not a religious authority, lacking the age and experience to become a commanding figure in Shi'ite Islam. His older brother was devoted to prayer, with no interest in politics, and Muqtada was left in charge of family politics and welfare, caring for his mother and two widowed sisters-in-law, since both his brothers were also murdered in 1999.
He rose to fame through the military wing of his political movement, the Mahdi Army, created in 2004 to fight the Americans. It consists of about 1,000 trained combatants and an estimated 5,000-6,000 supporters. He claimed that he was more legitimate than any other government body imposed on Iraq by the Americans, or elected under the auspices of the US.
Today, he is trying to establish himself and the younger generation of Shi'ites as the natural leaders of the community, rather than Hakim. He grabs every opportunity to challenge Hakim, including the latest Shi'ite autonomy issue. In April last year, his army went to war against US and Iraqi forces in Baghdad. One month earlier, post-Saddam authorities had shut down his newspaper, al-Hawza, accusing it of instigating violence among Iraqis.
Fighting spread throughout Iraq, and US forces got involved in terrible and fierce combat with the Shi'ite militias of Muqtada. By April 8, 2004, the Mahdi Army had taken full control of the city of Kut and partial control of Najaf. Fighting broke out in Sadr City in Baghdad and Sunni insurgents, inspired by Muqtada's rebellion, also revolted in Baghdad, Ramadi, Samarra, and, most notably, Fallujah, where a rebellion raged until suppressed by the Americans in November 2004.
A truce was reached in June 2004 and Muqtada, being wise, decided to disband the Mahdi Army. He added that he would be joining the political process, an act that was welcomed by interim president Ghazi al-Yawer. The then prime minister, Iyad Allawi, gave him assurances that he would not be arrested. Allawi reneged on his promise and on August 3, 2004, the US military and Iraqi police raided his home with mortar shelling, gunfire and grenades. They wanted to arrest or kill Muqtada and destroy his movement. Muqtada's army was outnumbered by 2,000 US Marines and 1,800 Iraqi security force members.
Muqtada was cornered at a mosque, and hundreds of his supporters were killed in the fighting. The war was ended by Sistani, who negotiated that Muqtada be saved but his militia be disbanded, and that the US troops leave Najaf.
Muqtada joined the political process in January, but did not personally run for office. Yet since August, Muqtada has been overwhelmingly opposed to the constitution drafting process, and the draft was mainly authored by the Shi'ites and Kurds. On August 26, 100,000 of his followers demonstrated all over Iraq opposing the new constitution. The US and Muqtada's enemies at home accuse him of wanting to create a theocracy in Iraq, similar to the model in Iran. Muqtada claims that this is untrue, saying that this is the objective of his rival, the Iran-backed Hakim. What he wants, he has often said, is to create an Islamic democracy. In May 2004 he told his supporters: "Don't use my death or arrest as an excuse not to finish what you have started."
The US has said that Muqtada and his men are nothing but a group of street thugs who have no support among the Iraqi grassroots. His opponents in the Shi'ite community have accused him of murdering two rival Shi'ite leaders after the fall of Saddam in 2003. Yet a recent US-sponsored poll in Iraq showed that 67% of respondents supported Muqtada. They consider him a devote nationalist, uninterested in material gain since he lives a very simple and ascetic life. His is a gifted orator and is considered a charismatic leader, due to his age and thundering anti-Americanism. He has gained thousands of supporters from the Friday prayers he delivers in Kufa, where he interacts directly with worshippers, casting a magical spell on them with his inflammatory sermons.
Of the 67% people polled, an impressive 32% offered "strong support" to Muqtada, while 36% said they "somewhat support him". His supporters can be found in the slums and ghettos of Baghdad and southern Iraq, unlike those of Sistani, who commands support among middle and upper-class Shi'ites and within the Shi'ite business community.
Sistani and Hakim lead the urban rich, Muqtada leads the urban and rural poor. Young, poor men support Muqtada not because he is a religious man like Sistani, but because he is a man of principle, they believe, and precisely because he is a rebel. His images are plastered all over Shi'ite towns in southern Iraq, but particularly in Sadr City, a slum inhabited by 2 million on the outskirts of Baghdad that was once called Saddam City but renamed after Muqtada's father after Saddam's fall in 2003.
In Sadr City, Muqtada is king. His authority surpasses that of any other Shi'ite leader in Iraq. He has his own welfare system, one codes, laws, education and police system. Judges in Sadr City are appointed by Muqtada himself and verdicts are enforced by his stalwarts. The selling of alcohol is prohibited, as are video cassettes, CDs and cinemas. Veiling is obligatory. The religious police force resembles those that existed in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and under the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Liberal and secular Shi'ites claim that Muqtada's authority in Sadr City is "worse than Saddam". Senior clerics in the community, fearing his radical politics, issued an official condemnation of Muqtada and his Mahdi Army, saying: "The army is composed of suspicious elements including individuals from the extinct regime who have wrapped their heads with white and black rags to mislead people into believing that they are men of religion, when in truth they are devils. We do not need your army. The imam [al-Mahdi] is in no need of an army made up of thieves, robbers and perverts under the leadership of a one-eyed charlatan."
Is Muqtada an imposter and a perverter of the Shi'ite cause? Is he a terrorist who must be killed? Or is he a true Shi'ite rebel and honest Iraqi nationalist? Regardless of the answer, it is too late to do anything about the rebel Shi'ite. Had the Americans wished, they could have killed him in 2003 when they first came to Iraq. They issued threats to have him arrested, but stopped short of doing that for a variety of reasons. One was that they underestimated how strong he really was and how much he could mobilize the Shi'ite street. Another reason was that they did not want to make a martyr out of him and inspire a new rebellion.
The reality in Iraq is that the US should engage in dialogue with Muqtada. He has the ability to bring both calm and chaos to Iraq. His history proves that despite his apparent rigidness, he can be negotiated with, as was the case in 2003-2004. He once said, "I will only negotiate with the Americans if their country says that it has come here to liberate us, not to occupy us, as occupying a country is incompatible with the very principle of negotiations. We are not hostile to America, but we are the enemy of occupation. I only want a government based on freedom and rule by the people. Obviously, such a government will be an Islamic one."
He even went on to distance himself from the radical Islam of US enemies like al-Qaeda and its Iraq chief, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, by saying: "There is no religion or religious law that punishes by beheading. True, they are your enemies and occupiers, but this does not justify cutting off their heads."
Muqtada is willing to join the political process and is willing to silence, or curb, his opposition to the US military in Iraq. What he wants is clear: leadership of the Shi'ite community within the context of a unified Iraq. If snubbed, Muqtada will probably unleash his wrath once again, this time against Hakim and other Shi'ite leaders who are advocating autonomy in the south.
He will wage a war once again against US forces, and perhaps will join forces with the Sunni insurgency. Bickering among the Shi'ites will deprive the US of its core of support in the Shi'ite community. With the Sunnis on the offensive, this would leave the Americans with nobody but the Kurds as allies.
The ensuing civil war would shed a vast amount of blood. To avoid that, the US would have to do two things: prevent, at any cost, the creation of an autonomous Shi'ite region in the south, and once the idea is totally discarded, deal with radicals like Muqtada with as much seriousness and respect as it does with Hakim.
By turning a blind eye to Muqtada, he will not go away or become less anti-American. By snubbing him at the expense of Hakim, all the US will be doing is making him more radical and dangerous. It will be hastening the onset of civil war.
Some would argue that negotiating with Muqtada would be a defeatist policy, and many have already drawn parallels with British premier Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Adolf Hitler in 1938, which gifted Czechoslovakia to the Nazis. This only enhanced Hitler's ambitions, bringing him to the conclusion that he was dealing with cowards who would not stand in his way of occupying the rest of Europe.
The perfect response to this argument was made by Professor Juan Cole in an article entitled "The Crock of Appeasement". He wrote: "Right-wingers who want to play [Winston] Churchill and denounce appeasement should please go off to Iraq and put their own lives on the line instead of playing politics with the lives of our brave troops from the safety of Washington DC."
The Americans need a Chamberlain in Iraq today, not a Churchill. The Iraqis need an Abraham Lincoln who is determined to keep the country unified. |
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
I really liked this article outside of the citation by Juan Cole. People with power on the street and on tribal levels need to be trusted by the US if they want to see their policies implemented. Moreover, it would be part of disengagement. As it is, by not allowing sovereignty, the US is anchoring itself in Iraq more tightly than perhaps may need be. Should the US begin to broker open deals with players like Moqtada and Sistani, world opinion would approve (as much as they'll approve of anything American in Iraq) and then if anything unravels, the US may be blamed less (possibly, although I think America will be blamed for almost every misdeed in Iraq for as long as I'm alive). |
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Bulsajo
Joined: 16 Jan 2003
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| Posted: Fri Sep 23, 2005 9:50 am Post subject: |
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It is a very interesting article but I was not surprised to find that it was written by a Syrian as I thought it had a decidely Arab nationalist flavour to it, in that he thought Shi'ites should have more of a committment towards Iraqi nationalism because they are Arab, and less of a commitment towards Shi'ite nationalism. Why? Somehow I don't think this reasoning will cut it with most Shi'ites.
The US negotiate with Al Sadr? Okay, so he doesn't believe in beheadings, but he's only a step or two removed from being a terrorist. But then again, if Arafat could do it, why not Sadr? |
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Kuros
Joined: 27 Apr 2004
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| Posted: Sat Sep 24, 2005 2:00 am Post subject: |
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| Bulsajo wrote: |
| The US negotiate with Al Sadr? Okay, so he doesn't believe in beheadings, but he's only a step or two removed from being a terrorist. But then again, if Arafat could do it, why not Sadr? |
There's a big difference between being a militant and being a terrorist. Sadr is definitely a militant but he has shown on more than one occasion that he can be reined in by Sistani.
But now that I think about it, whatever the US touches turns to puppet...at least that's the perception (and thus the reality). If the US is to make deals, it can't embrace people too much, and dealing with Moqtada would take kid gloves for reasons beyond the fact that he is a militant operating with interests sometimes seperate from the US.
| Bulsajo wrote: |
| Somehow I don't think this reasoning will cut it with most Shi'ites. |
No, not simply as the author has put it. But I think given the massive influence of Shi'a in Iraqi affairs since they have a majority demographically and even a larger share of power in the Congressional Counicl, combined by the real threat a civil war would pose to the Shi'a, they should start making deals and cut Sunnis some pieces of the pie. |
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Summer Wine
Joined: 20 Mar 2005
Location: Next to a River
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| Posted: Sun Sep 25, 2005 4:57 am Post subject: |
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I found it to be an interesting read. To negate it simply because it was a syrian writer would be to negate the truth that he wrote. The question I guess needs to be asked, does the US plan to stay in Iraq for the next 30 years. If so, they have to deal with him or someone like him or kill him, making him a martyr just like his father is to the shiites.
You have to have a stable country or deal with the consequences of not having one. Will the american people be able to stay in Iraq? If history has anything to show, the answer can only be no. You didn't stick it out in Vietnam and the people who your nation did rescue from tyranny, 30 -60 years on were not so welcoming. Your neighbors aren't all that friendly from what you read on Daves.
Its not a criticism, simply an observation. The US military can't handle 30 yrs in the middle east. Look at Israel, their greatest sin in the eyes of their neighbors is that they exist, it is simply that at its most basic level. The US can't afford to drag it out too long regardless of what it believes at its heart. |
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Bulsajo
Joined: 16 Jan 2003
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| Posted: Sun Sep 25, 2005 8:00 am Post subject: |
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| Summer Wine wrote: |
| To negate it simply because it was a syrian writer would be to negate the truth that he wrote. |
Who is negating anything?
The guy has an obvious bias in his initial assumption that Arab nationalism should trump religious nationalism.
For someone raised in Syria and exposed to Ba'ishist ideology it's no surprise.
Pointing this out does not 'negate' the value of the article.
As for 'truth' of the article, I'll leave that to you. |
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Summer Wine
Joined: 20 Mar 2005
Location: Next to a River
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| Posted: Sun Sep 25, 2005 8:04 am Post subject: |
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| Fair point, I missed that distinction at the time I read your points. |
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