stillnotking
Joined: 18 Dec 2007
Location: Oregon, USA
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 Posted: Wed Mar 26, 2008 1:31 pm Post subject: Victory In Iraq |
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There's been some talk about this on the forum recently. Slate's Fred Kaplan just wrote a good, concise article on the topic:
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As the toll of Americans killed in Iraq topped 4,000 this week, President Bush publicly vowed "to make sure that those lives were not lost in vain"�that the war's outcome "will merit the sacrifice" and that "our strategy going forward" will be to "achieve victory."
We all wish that this were so. But what does he mean by "victory"?
The definition has evolved, or devolved, in the five years that this war has been raging. Originally, victory was conceived in grandiose terms. The defeat of Saddam Hussein's army and the toppling of his regime would spawn a new democratic Iraq, the example of which would ignite the flames of freedom across the Middle East.
Bush scaled back the standard in a November 2005 speech at the U.S. Naval Academy titled "A Strategy for Victory." This victory will come, he said, "when the terrorists and Saddamists can no longer threaten Iraq's democracy, when the Iraqi security forces can provide for the safety of their own citizens, and when Iraq is not a safe-haven for terrorists to plot new attacks on our nation."
In January 2007, the National Security Council formalized the concept in a document titled "The Iraq Strategy Review," which stated that the "strategic goal" was "a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror."
Bush and others have heralded much progress in the past year, as the troop surge went into effect and as Gen. David Petraeus devised new tactics based on counterinsurgency principles. Casualties have gone down, in some areas dramatically. The Iraqi army and police have grown in size.
However, by the Bush administration's own standards of success, laid out in the president's speech and the NSC's strategy review, we are no closer to victory now than we were when those documents were drafted. Iraq is not unified, it is only superficially democratic, it cannot govern itself, its security forces cannot provide for the safety of its citizens, and it remains more of a haven for terrorists than an ally in the war against them. |
Does anyone still believe that "a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror" is an attainable goal? The sine qua non of legitimate government is a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. No faction or group in Iraq is anywhere near this benchmark: the legitimacy conferred upon any Iraqi government, now and for the foreseeable future, is based on the exercise of American military force. Even if military supremacy were attained, none of the factions are friendly to US interests -- certainly not to the extent of being willing to tolerate a permanent US military presence that could be used against their neighbors. None are likely to consent to a free, open, ongoing democratic process. And none of the groups who lose out in this inevitable scramble for supremacy are likely to submit to the rule of the others. So much for legitimacy.
A more realistic picture of what Iraq will look like when we leave:
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In [Fallujah Chief of Police] Zobaie's world, to show mercy is to show weakness. In a land where men burn other men alive, harsh tactics are a small price to pay for imposing order, he said.
"We never tortured anybody," he said. "Sometimes we beat them during the first hours of capture."
His men, he added, abuse suspects because "they don't surrender easily. They don't confess. They say: 'I am innocent. I haven't done anything.' They start to defend themselves."
The story of Zobaie and his police force opens a window onto the Iraq that is emerging after five years of war. American ideals that were among the justifications for the 2003 invasion, such as promoting democracy and human rights, are giving way to values drawn from Iraq's traditions and tribal culture, such as respect, fear and brutality.
"We don't have any Thomas Jeffersons here," said Capt. Sean Miller, a member of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division from Fairfax, Va., who works closely with Zobaie. "What we do have here is generally a group of people who are trying to save a city. It won't fulfill our ideals or what we desire." |
Zobaie is hostile to Americans, hostile to the Iraqi central government, jealous of his position... and (probably correctly) believes that he is a bulwark against anarchy. No Thomas Jeffersons, indeed. This is the reality of Iraq: a factionalized, tribal society, with no history of the rule of law and no earthly reason to be an American client state after the American military departs.
Whether or not you think this fact has been obvious from the beginning, and whatever you believe about the motives of the war's architects, it is folly to continue chasing a mirage. If no strategy offers the tangible hope of victory, then the only wise course is withdrawal. Anything else is merely delaying the inevitable.
The debate in 2002-2003 centered around "should we invade?" The debate today centers around "should we stay?" Both questions miss the point. If we stay, just what are we supposed to do? What are we shooting for? In the absence of a plausible goal for the occupation, does it make any sense whatsoever to argue about the negative consequences of ending it? |
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