Joo Rip Gwa Rhhee
Joined: 25 May 2003
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 Posted: Wed Apr 26, 2006 6:32 am Post subject: South Korea: Wagging the Dokdo Dog |
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South Korea: Wagging the Dokdo Dog
April 25, 2006 16 09 GMT
Summary
South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun on the morning of April 25 delivered a special policy speech on Seoul's claim to sovereignty over the Dokdo islets in the East Sea. In the speech, Roh called for a proactive and strong South Korean policy to oppose any Japanese claims to the islets, which Japan calls Takeshima, and linked the issue to Japan's colonization of South Korea and Japanese government visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Roh knows this will only enflame the issue between Seoul and Tokyo, but given his current political position, this is exactly the outcome he is seeking.
Analysis
South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun delivered a special policy speech, broadcast live on South Korean television the morning of April 25, outlining South Korea's stance on the question of sovereignty over the Dokdo islets in the East Sea, which are also claimed by Japan (and known there as Takeshima). Roh's speech, which ended the country's "silent diplomacy" over the dispute with Japan, follows heightened tensions between South Korea and Japan over their competing claims to the islets -- and thus the surrounding waters and resources.
Tensions between South Korea and Japan were on the rise after Japan announced plans to launch a hydrographic survey in the waters around Dokdo, a response to Seoul's moves to begin naming the unnamed seamounts surrounding Dokdo. South Korea upped the stakes, deploying coast guard vessels, and Japan stepped back, delaying the start of the survey and sending a diplomatic envoy to Seoul. On April 22, Seoul and Tokyo had apparently defused the rising tensions after a two-day meeting between Japanese Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi and South Korean First Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Yu Myung Hwan, in which Japan agreed to withhold surveys of the area if South Korea refrained from naming the seamounts.
With Roh's speech, this deal has been tossed out the window. Roh started his live national address with the oft-repeated mantra in South Korea: "Dokdo is our land." He then went on to link the dispute over Dokdo to the fundamental aspect of South Korea's independence and national identity, and to Japanese colonial rule and Japanese officials' continued visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Roh bluntly said that "Dokdo for us (Korea) is not merely a matter pertaining to territorial rights over tiny islets but is emblematic of bringing closure to an unjust history in our relationship with Japan and of the full consolidation of Korea's sovereignty."
Reversing Seoul's "silent diplomacy," which previously guided a quiet and relatively nonconfrontational approach to Japan's claims on the islets, Roh warned that any "physical provocations" (Japanese encroachment on Korea's claimed waters around Dokdo) "will be met with strong and firm response," adding, "This is a matter where no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs and sacrifices may be."
For Roh, the rousing (as far as Roh's intonation can be called rousing) nationalistic speech was an attempt to regain relevance inside South Korea. The South Korean government system combines a parliament with a president. Power is vested in the president rather than the prime minister, but the president is allowed neither a vice president nor a second term. Thus, about halfway through the five-year term, the president shifts from a driving force to a lame duck and parliament is left posturing over the next elections while the president is devoid of any meaningful power.
Roh is attempting to reverse this course by playing on the very issue that got him elected in the first place: Korean nationalism. It is no coincidence that, while Japanese and South Korean officials were meeting over the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, South Korean and North Korean delegates were meeting over bilateral issues. In those talks, North Korea proposed working cooperatively with the South over the Dokdo issue. It should be noted that North Korea has never taken a "silent diplomacy" approach to the Japanese claims on Takeshima, and any graphical representation of the Korean Peninsula always has a prominent dot representing the islets.
For Roh, this is a potentially dangerous path, but one he feels he can best harness. The six-party talks have stalled, undermining his plans for closer economic cooperation with the North; the free trade agreement negotiation with the United States is taking hits from all political parties at home; the South Korean economy is starting to slow in part due to the rising energy prices; and Roh is finding it difficult to maneuver. Playing the Japanese card becomes a way to refocus inter-Korean initiatives, rekindle the Korean nationalism that brought him into power, and jumpstart his military modernization and strengthening drive -- all during a time in his presidency when he would normally be seen as powerless.
Such statements are bound to draw an equally bellicose response from Japan, where the Dokdo issue and disputes with China over energy deposits in the East China Sea are being used to raise the sense of Japanese nationalism. Likewise, China and South Korea are playing on these nationalistic issues, creating a situation driven by both emotion and domestic considerations, and raising rhetorical tensions in Northeast Asia. But these tensions may not remain rhetorical as each nation begins deploying its coast guard and navy to the disputed waters, a situation that invites accidents and over-reactions |
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