I thought I had already made a posting on this view of Stephen's, but can't seem to find it now, so I guess I'll have another go at it.
Stephen Jones wrote:The reason we use three terms for modality is because there are three distinct linguistic phenomena.
To attempt to shoehorm all three into the epistemic definition as Larry wishes doesn't lead to clarity in the least.
Incidentally I agree with most of what Lewis says. [
I am delighted to hear this, Stephen, but I wouldn't have guessed it from your postings here and elsewhere on Dave's.] However I believe what he says about modality to be hogwash. [
Fair enough, but that doesn't end the matter.]
I cannot see why you feel Lewis's explanation is clear, Larry, or why you find the concepts of epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality to be unclear. I suspect it is because of your belief that their should be one, and only one, explantion for all linguistic phenomena.
Let me try and give a very basic description of modality as I see it.
First,
modality is opposed to
polarity, that is to say it covers the area between the two poles 'yes' and 'no'. Modality is a semantic category, not a grammatical one, and there are various ways of expressing it including, mood, modal verbs, and adverbs.
Modality can question the
factuality of an event. This is called
epistemic modality.
Examples:
He ('ll/must/could/may/might/can't/won't) have finished now.
It ('ll/could/can/may/might/can't/won't) happen.
It is clear that the effect of the modal auxiliary in these cases is on the degree of possibility (though you can have fun tryng to explain the difference between 'will' and must, and 'can't' and 'won't' in these cases). That is to say the difference between the different modals is more on of degree of probability than any inherent semantic difference.
That is why the other two kinds of modality are sometimes called
root modality, because they have a definite semantic load.
Deontic modality is conerned with permission, obligation or advisablity. Like
epistemic modality it normally reflects the view of he speaker, but there is such a thing as
objective deontic modality where the obligation is imposed by external rules.
Examples:
You can come in now.
Can/may/might I borrow your car?
You mustn't touch that.
You needn't come in tomorrow.
Women must/have to cover their hair in Saudi Arabia.
Note that deontic modality reflects the attitude of the speaker, or of a set of rules he is conveying. Where this is not true we have
dynamic modality.
Examples:
She can speak French very well.
He won't listen, however often you tell him.
The modals reflect the attitude or ability of the subject, and not that of the speaker.
So there are two separate factors in grouping modality:
- (i)non-root (no or little semantic load) epistemic modality
versus
root (semantic load) doentic & dynamic modality.
(ii)Expressing the attitude of the speaker epistemic and deontic modality
versus
independent of the attitude of the speaker dynamic modality.
Now this is more complicated than simply assigning core meanings to each modal auxiliary. However, it describes what exists in the language, as opposed to in the hopes of the linguist. The main reason why the description of modals and modality is complex is because the use of modals is complex. False over-simplification is not the way to go.
First, modality is opposed to polarity, that is to say it covers the area between the two poles 'yes' and 'no'. Modality is a semantic category, not a grammatical one, and there are various ways of expressing it including, mood, modal verbs, and adverbs.
Hmmm. It covers the area between 'yes' and 'no'. Isn't that what 'maybe' is for,
Stephen? I'm having a little trouble seeing why we should get into such a tizzy over modality if we're just talking about the area between 'yes' and 'no'. That modality has to do with meaning rather than form is, I think, uncontroversial here. However, modal auxiliaries, in particular, do surely conform to certain formal guidelines regarding their placement in the verb phrase, and exclusivity within it. I really am trying hard to see what you're getting at here, but so far, to no avail. Saying that modality is opposed to polarity does not clarify things for me about what modality really is.
Modality can question the factuality of an event. This is called epistemic modality.
Examples:
He ('ll/must/could/may/might/can't/won't) have finished now.
It ('ll/could/can/may/might/can't/won't) happen.
It is clear that the effect of the modal auxiliary in these cases is on the degree of possibility (though you can have fun tryng to explain the difference between 'will' and must, and 'can't' and 'won't' in these cases). That is to say the difference between the different modals is more on of degree of probability than any inherent semantic difference.
With all due respect to you,
Stephen, and also to academic linguists who make this stuff up, it seems like nonsense to me.
A fact is a fact only when we all agree that it is. One can call a fact into question, of course, and that can be done in a zillion different ways. Saying that modal auxiliaries provides a way to do it, is simply another way to put what I've said all along:
Modal auxiliaries give speakers a device for commenting on the proposition put forth in a sentence. The comment is exterior to the factual part of the proposition, even as it occurs inside the verb phrase in the sentence.
He can't have finished now has, as the factual proposition put forth:
He has finished now, or more properly,
He is finished. I say more properly for the second example because it is presented in simpler grammatical terms, to wit: closer to 'pure' fact without the baggage of aspectual elements. The purest factual statements are presented in either present simple or past simple tense:
Water boils at 100 degrees.
He went home already.
About these 'facts' there can be no arguement of degree. But adding a modal auxiliary to any sentence always calls the 'facts' into question, because adding a comment always means that the speaker himself is qualifying the proposition.
He can't have finished now is not only a sentence about "
He", but also about how the speaker views the 'fact', "
He is finished".
You say that the difference between individual modals is a matter of degree of probability rather than any real semantic difference. If that is true, then there must exist a kind of sequence ranging from the least degree of probability to the highest degree. Can you line them up for me,
Stephen, proceeding from one extreme to the other? I'm having trouble working that out.
That is why the other two kinds of modality are sometimes called root modality, because they have a definite semantic load.
Deontic modality is conerned with permission, obligation or advisablity. Like epistemic modality it normally reflects the view of he speaker, but there is such a thing as objective deontic modality where the obligation is imposed by external rules.
Examples:
You can come in now.
Can/may/might I borrow your car?
You mustn't touch that.
You needn't come in tomorrow.
Women must/have to cover their hair in Saudi Arabia.
Hmmm. "Definite semantic load." That sounds impressive indeed, but for me it has no semantic actualization. It doesn't mean anything to me. For one thing, your examples are the same ones as your examples for epistemic modals (
can, may, might), and for another, are you saying that describing different degrees of probability of factuality (your notion, not mine) has no "semantic load"? That's hard for me to grasp.
Then you maintain that "objective deontic modality" imposes obligation by external rules. External to what? It seems to me that
You can come in now imposes no obligation to begin with, since the addressee can simply refuse to come in, and whatever permission might be granted with the use of "
can" is granted by the speaker rather than by some external entity. I have the same objection to all of your other examples: it is the
speaker and not some external force who qualifies the proposition offered by the rest of the sentence.
Note that deontic modality reflects the attitude of the speaker, or of a set of rules he is conveying. Where this is not true we have dynamic modality.
Examples:
She can speak French very well.
He won't listen, however often you tell him.
The modals reflect the attitude or ability of the subject, and not that of the speaker.
Now this is really too much,
Stephen. In
She can speak French very well, is it the attitude of 'She' that she speaks French well, or is it the attitude of the person speaking? In
He won't listen, is it 'He' who is telling us he has his ears plugged, or is it the speaker of the sentence?
Your ideas, however cleverly presented, just don't seem to me to stand up to examination. I hesitate to use the word 'hogwash', because much of what you say about grammar is well conceived and right to the point. But your ideas about modality are, well, hogwash.
Larry Latham