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Interested
Joined: 10 Feb 2003
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 Posted: Fri Aug 21, 2009 2:00 am Post subject: An alternative take on Neville Chamberlain |
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My dad once pointed out that he thought Chamerlain had had a bum rap, so it was with interest that I read the following article.
Neville Chamberlain should be praised, not buried
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Faced with an impossible situation, Neville Chamberlain performed better than anyone else would have done, argues the historian David Dutton.
As we prepare to mark the 70th anniversary of the start of the Second World War, a familiar narrative has reasserted itself: Winston Churchill as saviour of the nation; Neville Chamberlain as the man who nearly doomed it. A new exhibition at the Imperial War Museum uses Chamberlain's diaries to illustrate his inadequacy, while polls among academics, journalists and the public have consistently placed him at or near the bottom of the list of Downing Street's occupants. But what if the received wisdom is wrong?
In most minds, Chamberlain remains the "Guilty Man" who sought, vainly and foolishly, to quench Hitler's insatiable thirst through unjustified concessions, generally at the expense of other nations. The policy with which he is inextricably associated � appeasement � has become a dirty word in international diplomacy, with the supposed lessons of the 1930s trundled out with monotonous regularity to justify a hard line towards aggression.
Chamberlain, we are told, was duped into thinking Hitler a man of reason and compromise, a man who could be trusted to keep agreements. Even his slightly ridiculous appearance � wing collar and furled umbrella � seemed to sum up the hopeless imbalance between Britain's unpreparedness for war and the ruthless might of the Nazis.
Yet few academic historians still subscribe to this view. Of course, Chamberlain made mistakes in the 1930s. He overestimated his ability to reach a settlement with the dictators; he probably clung too long to the hope of averting war. But it is doubtful if anyone else would have done much better, Churchill included.
Chamberlain was no fool. But no individual could change the basic facts of the international scene, which made fighting Germany almost unthinkable for most of the decade. Like all his generation, Chamberlain had been deeply scarred by the memory of the First World War. Expert opinion predicted that any future war would be even worse: to the slaughter of the battlefield would be added unspeakable destruction from the air. Extrapolating from the Spanish Civil War, it was estimated that the first few weeks of a German air assault would bring half a million casualties: Britain was defenceless in the face of the bomber.
Of course, the calculations were way off the mark. But Chamberlain was doing what many of his critics complain he was reluctant to do � following expert advice. In addition, he was only too aware of the unfavourable balance of power. The enormous coalition assembled against the Kaiser's Germany could not be recreated: only France was clearly on board, and of her military capacity Chamberlain was deeply sceptical (with good reason).
In such a situation, the best option seemed to be peace at almost any price. Chamberlain still retained that belief on September 1, 1939, when Hitler's forces invaded Poland � breaching the Anglo-French guarantee of Polish independence issued at the end of March, and the Anglo-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance signed in the final days of August. It took 48 hours before he could bring himself to enter the words "war declared" in the pocket diary now on display at the Imperial War Museum, two days which were among the most dramatic of his premiership and which did much to damn his historical reputation.
Despite the hesitation, Chamberlain's behaviour was honourable: he was not seeking another sellout along the lines of Munich, but to synchronise any declaration of war with the French, who needed time to mobilise and to evacuate civilians. The delay, however, cost him dear. When he spoke to the Commons on September 2, it was clear he had lost the confidence of vast swathes of the House � and his statement still failed to indicate any ultimatum to Germany. When Arthur Greenwood, the Labour deputy leader, rose to reply, a backbencher called out, "Speak for England": a clear indication that this was what Chamberlain had failed to do.
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Koveras
Joined: 09 Oct 2008
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| Posted: Fri Aug 21, 2009 4:31 am Post subject: Re: An alternative take on Neville Chamberlain |
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| I argued this exact same thesis in a highschool history paper. I got 100. If academic consensus is swinging this way, it's thanks to me. |
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Hater Depot
Joined: 29 Mar 2005
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Sergio Stefanuto
Joined: 14 May 2009
Location: UK
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| Posted: Fri Aug 21, 2009 8:39 pm Post subject: |
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| Hater Depot's article wrote: |
| Like Bush, Chamberlain also laid claim to unprecedented executive authority, evading the checks and balances that are supposed to constrain the office of prime minister. He scorned dissenting views, both inside and outside government. When Chamberlain arranged his face-to-face meetings with Hitler in 1938 that ended in the catastrophic Munich conference, he did so without consulting his cabinet, which, under the British system, is responsible for making policy. He also bypassed the House of Commons, leading Harold Macmillan, a future Tory prime minister who was then an anti-appeasement MP, to complain that Chamberlain was treating Parliament "like a Reichstag, to meet only to hear the orations and to register the decrees of the government of the day." |
Next time I see the photo of Chamberlain and Hitler, I shall think "dictator meets Hitler" |
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Manner of Speaking
Joined: 09 Jan 2003
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| Posted: Fri Aug 21, 2009 10:18 pm Post subject: |
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Problem with this hypothesis is that if Chamberlain's peace bought Britain time, it bought it at the expense of a democracy and ally: Czechoslovakia. Hitler was logistially ready to conquer Poland in 1939, but he would have been in serious difficulty if Britain, France and Czechoslovakia had stood up to him in 1938.
Czechoslovakia submitted to Hitler in 1938 because the Czechs realized their allies Britain and France were not going to back them up. Stalin decided to seek rapproachement with Germany because of Munich, when it was clear to the USSR that the western allies were not going to stand up to Hitler. Chamberlain might have postponed the probem, but in the end he only made it worse. |
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Kuros
Joined: 27 Apr 2004
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| Posted: Sat Aug 22, 2009 12:28 am Post subject: |
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| Manner of Speaking wrote: |
Problem with this hypothesis is that if Chamberlain's peace bought Britain time, it bought it at the expense of a democracy and ally: Czechoslovakia. Hitler was logistially ready to conquer Poland in 1939, but he would have been in serious difficulty if Britain, France and Czechoslovakia had stood up to him in 1938.
Czechoslovakia submitted to Hitler in 1938 because the Czechs realized their allies Britain and France were not going to back them up. Stalin decided to seek rapproachement with Germany because of Munich, when it was clear to the USSR that the western allies were not going to stand up to Hitler. Chamberlain might have postponed the probem, but in the end he only made it worse. |
Right. The article conveniently fails to mention Czechoslovakia, which seems like the best one-word rebuttal to this apologist piece. |
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Manner of Speaking
Joined: 09 Jan 2003
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| Posted: Sat Aug 22, 2009 3:48 am Post subject: |
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| Kuros wrote: |
| Manner of Speaking wrote: |
Problem with this hypothesis is that if Chamberlain's peace bought Britain time, it bought it at the expense of a democracy and ally: Czechoslovakia. Hitler was logistially ready to conquer Poland in 1939, but he would have been in serious difficulty if Britain, France and Czechoslovakia had stood up to him in 1938.
Czechoslovakia submitted to Hitler in 1938 because the Czechs realized their allies Britain and France were not going to back them up. Stalin decided to seek rapproachement with Germany because of Munich, when it was clear to the USSR that the western allies were not going to stand up to Hitler. Chamberlain might have postponed the probem, but in the end he only made it worse. |
Right. The article conveniently fails to mention Czechoslovakia, which seems like the best one-word rebuttal to this apologist piece. |
There is no shortage of professional historians and theorists who advance illogical theories or just plain BS in order to cut a name for themselves professionally. This guy seems like one of them. |
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